GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY-ARMED

FORCES-

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING SERVICEMEN'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS NOT ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY-Jaffee

v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir.

Feb. 20, 1980).
Feres v. United States 1 was an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act 2 (FTCA) in which the executrix of a soldier alleged that
the government had been negligent in quartering the deceased in
unsafe barracks. The Supreme Court, refusing to construe the FTCA
so as to permit recovery under those circumstances, held that the Act
was not intended to render the government liable for injuries to ser3
In
vicemen sustained "in the course of activity incident to service."
the thirty years since Feres was decided, various lower courts have
interpreted it as creating a doctrine of absolute "intramilitary" immunity which protects both the government and individual officials
from liability for any injuries to members of the armed forces. 4 This
interpretation was recently refuted through an analysis of the history
of Feres and an examination of subsequent Supreme Court decisions
in the areas of official immunity 5 and federal common law. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Jaffee v. United

340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2 The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, see 28 U.S.C.

§§

1291, 1346(b)-1346(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(a)-2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-72,
2674-80 (1976), which, bv its terms, applies the law of the place when the [wrongfull act or
omission occurred." Id. § 1346(b).
3 340 U.S. at 146.
4 E.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1142 (4th Cir. 1975); Misko v. United States,
453 F. Supp. 513, 514, 516 (D.D.C. 1978). Roach v. Shields, 371 F. Supp. 1392, 1393 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). See also Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REV. 24
(1976); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery,
77 MICH. L. REx'. 1099 (1979).
1 Just as sovereign immunity operates as an absolute bar to an action for damages against
the government, so too official immunity shields individual government officers from liability for
discretionarv acts within the scope of their authority. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218-25 (1963). See generally Engdahl, Im-

imunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972).
Absolute immunity precludes an action for damages against the immunized officials. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense whereby government officials are exonerated upon a
showing of good faith. Inbler v. Pactman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1975). Official immunity is
applicable only in the context of a suit for damages. It is not a defense to an action fnr injlnc-

tive relief. See wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975); Conover v. Montemuro, 477
F.2d 1073, 1096-1104 (3d Cir. 1973) (Gibbons, J., concurring in the result).
Traditionally, absolute immunity was justified by reference to the inequities inherent in
empowering federal officials with discretionary authority and then penalizing them for the exercise of that authority.
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States,6 rejected a doctrine of absolute immunity in favor of a rule of
qualified immunity for federal military and civilian officials charged
with conducting unlawful programs of human experimentation on
American servicemen.
Stanley Jaffee was one of an estimated 250,000 soldiers who, in
the years between 1946 and 1962, were forced to participate in nuclear test explosions in order to gauge the immediate effects of massive
radiation exposure on combat troops. 7 In the spring of 1953, while
on active duty at Camp Desert Rock, Nevada, Jaffee was ordered to
stand in a field while a nuclear bomb was exploded a short distance
away. He was not informed of the potential health hazards or given
an opportunity to refuse to participate, nor was he provided with any
protective clothing or equipment. 8 In November, 1977, Jaffee
discovered that he, like many other "atomic veterans," had developed
radiation-induced cancer as a result of his role in the nuclear testing
program. 9 He and his wife, Sharon Blynn Jaffee, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against
the individual officials in the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, and the Atomic Energy Commission who were
responsible for conducting the experiment. The Jaffees sued directly
under the first, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth amendments of the
Constitution, alleging that these officials had knowingly and recklessly
directed the tests without legal authority or military justification. ' 0

[O]fficial immunity apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent
rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness
to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public
good.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974)(footnote omitted). The Supreme Court, however,

has declared that the abrogation of absolute immunity is an important means of preventing
governmental abuse and vindicating constitutional rights. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,

480-81 (1978). Accord, Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1415 (1980). Cognizant
of the possible chilling effects of imposing liability upon federal officials and yet aware that the
broad authority possessed by these officials affords a greater potential for lawless conduct, the
Court has adopted a rule of qualified immunity with respect to unconstitutional activity. Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-06 (1978).

6 No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1980). See also Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee I), 592 F.2d
712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (earlier appeal of same case involving question
of sovereign immunity). For a discussion of Jaffee I, see Comment, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 377
(1979).
1 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1980, § A, at 10, col. 1.8 Slip op. at 3-4.
9 See Jaffee v. United States, Amended Complaint at 4, 9.
10 Slip op. at 3-4.
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The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that Feres
"exempt[ed] these defendants from liability.""
The court of appeals
reversed. Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, held that Feres did
not create a rule of absolute immunity for military superiors against
12
suits by members of the armed forces for willful torts.
Emphasizing that the Jaffees' complaint was premised not upon
negligence under the FTCA, as was the claim in Feres, but rather
upon a constitutionally proscribed intentional tort, 13 Judge Gibbons
turned his attention to Gregoire v. Biddle.14 He noted that at the
same time that Feres had been before the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Gregoire v. Biddle was being considered by a different panel in the same circuit. 15 Gregoire was an action against five
members of the executive branch of government for conspiring to arrest and detain the plaintiff on the pretense that he was an enemy
alien. Relying upon an 1896 case in which the Supreme Court recognized official immunity for a cabinet member acting "pursuant to an
act of Congress," 16 the court of appeals dismissed the Gregoire complaint on the ground that federal officials were entitled to absolute
immunity. 1 7 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.' 8
The juxtaposition of Feres and Gregoire served as the basis upon
which Judge Gibbons distinguished the issue in Feres from that in
Jaffee.19 He posited that the difference between Feres and Gregoire
was the difference between construing the liability of the United
States under the then newly enacted FTCA and adopting a broad
interpretation of a judicially created immunity doctrine. It was the
20
development of the latter that was central to the issue in Jaffee.
11Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir.
Feb. 20, 1980).
12 Slip op. at 5, 18-19.
13 Id. at 5-6. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARY.

L. REX'.

1532 (1972);

Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a

Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4
CONST. L. Q. 531 (1977).

HASTINGS

14 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, .,39 U.S. 949 (1950).

15 Slip op. at 6.
16 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
17 177 F.2d at 581.
"s 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
19 Slip op. at 6-7.
20 Id. at 8.
The law of individual personal immunity of federal officers has undergone an entirely separate development in a series of cases beginning in 1959 .ith Barrv.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, and Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, and culminating with
the Court's most recent discussion in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). It is
to the personal immunity holdings and not to the interpretations of the Federal Tort
Claims Act that we must look for the solution to the present quandary.
Slip op. at 8.
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The focus of the court's analysis was the effect of the abrogation
of absolute immunity for state officials and the expansion of the doctrine of federal common law upon the Supreme Court's subsequent
rejection of a rule of absolute immunity for federal officials accused of
constitutional violations. In tracing the movement from absolute to
qualified official immunity, Judge Gibbons noted that when con-

fronted with the immunity question ten years after its denial of certiorari in Gregoire, only four members of the Supreme Court were

willing to embrace a rule of absolute immunity for federal officials. 21
He stated that by 1974, as evidenced by its decision in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 22 "it had become apparent to the Court that a Gregoire type
absolute immunity ... simply was too dangerous for general application to state officials." 23 It was a unanimous Supreme Court which

held in Scheuer that the Governor of Ohio, as head of the National
Guard, was not absolutely immune from damages under section 1983
for the intentional use of excessive force to quell the Kent State disturbances. As a result, the Jaffee court averred that at least with re24
spect to state officials, qualified immunity became the rule.
Judge Gibbons recognized that a major obstacle to imposing liability on federal officials was the fear of subjecting them to the vagaries of state law, but he reasoned that by the time the Court had

perceived the improvidence of a rule of absolute immunity for state
officials, it had dispensed of the problem of non-uniformity 2

5

through

its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents. 26 The
Court in Bivens acknowledged the existence of a federal common law
through its pronouncement that a complaint against federal agents
seeking damages directly under the fourth amendment stated a cause
of action in the federal courts. The majority, however, declined to
address the immunity question inasmuch as the lower court had not
ruled on the issue. 27 Nonetheless, as Judge Gibbons observed, the
Bivens Court did proffer "the thought that at the very least such a
remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police misconduct." 28 Thus, Judge Gibbons noted that
two years after its decision in Bivens, the Court rejected a rule of
21

Slip op. at 9.

22 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

Slip op. at 11.
Id.
25 Id.
26 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
27 Id. at 397-98.
28 Slip op. at 10 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. at 411
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
23
24
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absolute immunity for lower level federal officials, 29 and in Butz v.
Econoinou,30 "finally and unequivocally" rejected a rule of absolute
immunity with respect to upper level federal officials charged with
31
committing intentional torts.
Quoting Justice White's opinion in Butz, Judge Gibbons set forth
the major arguments in support of imposing liability. Absolute immunity seriously erodes constitutional protection. The broad authority
possessed by federal officials increases the potential for lawless conduct. Most importantly, the availability of an action against individual
32
officials is an essential means of vindicating constitutional rights.
The court of appeals therefore determined that the rule in Butz
33
would not afford the officials in Jaffee absolute immunity.
After examining the history of official immunity, the court disposed of the notion that there is a separate category of intramilitary
immunity which is independent of the concepts of official and
sovereign immunity. The court attributed the misunderstanding regarding the existence of a per se intramilitary immunity to Justice
Jackson's statement in Feres that the Court knew "of no American law
which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence either
against his superior officers or the Government he is serving."34
Judge Gibbons noted that this holding pertains only to an action
grounded in negligence and that it did not purport to make a
member of the armed services absolutely immune from suit by
another member for a willful tort. He referred to the footnote accompanying the Feres text in which Justice Jackson compared the rule he

29
30
31
32

See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
438 U.S. 478 (1978).

Slip op. at 12.
Id. at 12-13 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 505-06).
31 Slip op. at 14.
34 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 141)(footnote omitted). Judge Gibbons, in discussing Justice Jackson's opinion in Feres, noted that the suggestion that there is an absolute
intramilitary immunity would be anomalous "coming from a Justice recently returned from acting as prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials." Slip op. at 16. That tribunal's most important
pronouncement was that individuals, not merely governments, should be held legally accountable for military wrongs. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 482 (1962). This was the crux of the
issue in Jaffee. Military discipline is a somewhat nebulous concept which encompasses both the
fear of a multiplicity of suits and potential draconian liability. Reliance on military discipline
amounts to "a gloss of form over substance ....
[I]t can perhaps be best explained with reference to unmentioned political and economic interests at stake in the controversy." Comment,
supra note 6, at 393 (footnote omitted).
Commentators have argued that the application of Feres should be limited to cases where it
is demonstrated that the maintenance of a suit would "undermine traditional concepts or military discipline." See Rhodes, supra note 4, at 32, 44; Note, supra note 4, at 1124-26. The courts
have not heeded the suggestion.
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was announcing in Feres with regard to negligence to that which had
36
5
been established in Dinsman v. Wilkes3 for intentional torts.
Dinsnan involved a suit by a marine against his commanding officer
for injuries incurred while on an expedition in the South Seas during
the 1830's. When Dinsman sought to be released from service at the
end of his term of enlistment, Captain Wilkes, the commander of the
ship, ordered him flogged and imprisoned. 3 7 In considering the
immunity issue the Dinsnan Court ruled, in Judge Gibbons words,
"that while there was a presumption of regularity with respect to the
imposition of military discipline, there was no absolute immunity
38
from liability for intentional torts."
Finally, the Jaffee court noted that no post-Feres Supreme Court
opinion had been found which supported the existence of a separate
category of intramilitary immunity. The court therefore concluded
that the immunity of military superiors was no more or no less than
39
that afforded other officials of the executive branch of government.
Essential to an understanding of the propriety of the Jaffee
court's enunciation of a rule of qualified immunity for military officials
is a familiarity with the nature of the immunity. Absolute official immunity originated as a means of protecting federal officials in the performance of their statutory duties from either civil or criminal liability
under state law.4 0 As indicated by the Court in Butz, however, and
reiterated by the court of appeals in Jaffee, since Bivens "the myth of
non-uniformity," insofar as the danger of imposing state standards of
liability on uniquely federal personages, has been "removed from the
discussion" due to the availability of a cause of action under federal
law. 4 1 Moreover, the immunity was never intended to insulate federal officials from liability for egregious wrongs or for activities palpa-

'5 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851). See also Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 93
(1849)(earlier appeal of same case). The Court in Dinsman focused upon the fact that while it is
essential to the efficient operation of the military that the authority of military superiors when
properly exercised be firmly supported in courts of law it is equally important for the preservation of civil liberty that those individuals serving our country who are the victims of improperly exercised authority be given the opportunity to seek redress in the courts. 53 U.S. (12
How.) at 403.
36 Slip op. at 16. See generally James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I.), vacated,
502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973).

3 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 402-03.
38 Slip op. at 17.
39 Id. at 19. "[W]e conclude that at best the immunity of the individual defendants is qual-

ified." Id. at 6.
40 Butz, 438 U.S. at 489. See also Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238-42 (discussion of origins of
immunity doctrines).
4 Slip op. at 12.
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bly beyond the limits of their authority. Justice White, writing for the
majority in Butz, discussed "the general rule, which long prevailed,
.. . that a federal official may not with impunity, ignore the limita42
tions which the controlling law has placed on his powers."
The precise limits of the qualified immunity defense were set
forth in the Supreme Court's opinion in Butz. 4 3 The extent of the
immunity varies depending upon the scope of discretion with which
an official is empowered."4 It is comprised of a subjective and an
objective element.4 5 Consequently, the official is immune where he
or she has acted in good faith and where reasonable grounds for a
good faith belief existed under the circumstances. 4 6 In addition, the
Butz Court's adoption of a qualified immunity was limited to constitutional claims. 4 7 Thus, upper level federal officials, including military officials, cannot be held accountable in damages for other than
constitutional transgressions. Also, damages are appropriate under
this standard only where the official has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such blatant disregard of a serviceman's
constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized
as being in good faith.
The Supreme Court has in recent years expressed repeated concern over the need to assure a remedy to the victims of governmental
abuses of power. 4 8 In Butz, the Court recognized that to immunize
the responsible civilian officials was to render nugatory the constitutional cause of action created in Bivens.4 9 The "frequently impenetrable" barrier of sovereign immunity requires a rule of qualified
official immunity o inasmuch as "a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished . . . constitutional guarantees" is a remedy for
damages. 51 Absolute immunity requires the immediate dismissal of
any suit against the immunized party. The abrogation of absolute immunity acts as a check on governmental abuse by permitting judicial

42 438 U.S. at 489-91.

43 Id. passim.
44 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247.
45 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1974).
46 416 U.S. at 247-48.
41 438 U.S. at 495 n.22.
48 E.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920. 1923 (1980): Owen v. City of Independence, 100
S. Ct. 1398, 1415-16 (1980). This is, of course, a recurring theme in many of the qualified

immunity and federal common law cases.
49 438 U.S. at 504-05.
50 Id. at 504.
51 Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1415 (1980).
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review of intentional misconduct. 5 2 Under Butz, there is no doubt
that civilian government employees, as well as the Nevada residents
living in the areas surrounding the nuclear test site, would be able to
withstand defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of official immunity. 53 The military status of the plaintiff should not be dispositive of
5 4
the immunity question.
Moreover, the rationale in Feres is not controlling with regard to
intentional torts. Three factors have been advanced as necessitating
the Court's denial of recovery for negligence in Feres: the distinctly
federal relationship between members of the armed forces and military superiors, the existence of a no-fault compensation scheme for
veterans, and the need for maintaining military discipline. 5 5 The law
has progressed to a point where the first rationale, the peculiarly federal character of the armed forces, is no longer a viable reason for
immunizing military officials. 5 6 In Davis v. Passnan57 the Supreme
Court sustained a federal common law cause of action directly under
the fifth amendment. Two months after the court of appeals filed its
opinion in Jaffee, the Court, in Carlson v. Green 58 once again extended its decision in Bivens by ruling that a remedy was available
under the eighth amendment against federal officials who deliberately
ignored the medical needs of a prison inmate. Davis and Carlson
dispelled any doubts about the Court's willingness to expand upon its
acknowledgment of federal common law in Bivens. In fact, the Court
in Carlson termed it "obvious" that the conduct of federal officials
should be governed by uniform standards. 5 9 Furthermore, the Court
declared that persons who have no other effective means of redress
"must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for
the
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." 60
52 "Judicial review may sometimes be specifically precluded by law, thus immunizing
policies that might shrivel if a search-light were turned upon them." W. GELLHORN, WHEN
AMERICANS COMPLAIN 27 (1966)(footnote omitted). The problem with dismissal at the pleading
stage is the inability to discover who made decisions and at what level they were made.
'3 See generally N.Y. Times, May 13, 1979, at 23 col. 6. See also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
54 Cf. slip op. at 10 (military status of defendant not determinative of liability).
55 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135; Jaffee, 468 F. Supp. at 633 (discussion of Feres holding).
" See notes 25-27 & 41 supra and accompanying text. Compare United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1946) with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
57 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
58 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Carlson, recognized that
federal officials are accorded adequate protection under the qualified immunity enunciated in
Butz. Id. at 1472.

59 Id. at 1474.
60 Davis, 442 U.S. at 242. The intentional deprivation of a liberty or property interest provides the strongest case for implying a federal common law cause of action. The standard of care
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The second justification for disallowing recovery for intramilitary
negligence under the FTCA in Feres was the existence of a "comprehensive system of relief" in the form of veterans' benefits. The
Court analogized veterans' benefits to workers' compensation payments and suggested that both were statutory schemes which provided a no-fault system of recovery in lieu of tort liability. 6 1 Workers'
compensation statutes, however, do not generally preclude common
law actions for damages against employers or third parties for intentional injuries. 62 Similarly, veterans' benefits should not be construed so as to prohibit suits against individual military tortfeasors for
wanton misconduct. Although the analogy may have mandated a dismissal in Feres, it did not militate against exposing the individual
defendants in Jaffee to liability.
The final reason cited by the Supreme Court for disallowing recovery for intramilitary negligence was the deleterious impact of such
suits upon military discipline. 63 The Court has most recently expressed its concern for military discipline in terms of the danger of
"second-guessing military orders." 64 Although the effect of litigation
upon military discipline is a valid concern, the need for deterrence in
the context of intentional unconstitutional activity is of greater importance. Imposing the threat of liability upon military officials charged
with intentional wrongdoing will deter future intramilitarv misconduct. The Court, in Carlson, emphasized the necessity of imposing liability as a means of deterrence and indicated that a remedy
recoverable against individual officials is a more effective deterrent
than a remedy against the government. 65 By confining its abrogation

for military personnel vis-a-vis other military personnel must be uniform. Unless the courts are
willing to supplant the entire body of common law, the case for federalizing negligence is a
weak one.
" Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45. This is the least persuasive of the reasons set forth in justification of the Feres doctrine. First, a no-fault compensation scheme does not adequately serve the
need for deterrence. Slip op. at 25 n.36. Second, the Court in Carlson refused to pronounce an
election of remedies where Congress had not done so. 100 S. Ct. at 1472. Third, the veterans'
administration has denied death and disability benefits to 98 percent of the atomic veterans who
have filed claims. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1980, § A, at 10 col. 3. See also Comment, supra note
6, at 393.
62 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68 (1976).
'3 The Feres Court did not list military discipline among its reasons for den)ing recovery
under the FTCA. The concern for military discipline was first articulated in United States v.
Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). See Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United, States, 431 U.S. 666,

671-72 (1977). Ironically, it has been suggested that military discipline is the only viable basis
for the continuation of the Feres doctrine today. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 29.
" Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
65 100 S. Ct. at 1473. But see Note, Balancing the Vindication of Constitutional Guarantees

Against the Effective Functioning of Government: The Official Immunity Scale Does Not
Work-Butz v. Economou, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.

143, 154-56 (1978).
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of absolute immunity to intentional torts of a constitutional dimension
and to "acts ordered or performed" in other than a tactical situation,6 6
the court of appeals in Jaffee effectively balanced the competing
interests inherent in the need for military discipline and the increasingly obvious need for deterrence. The scope of judicial review
remains appropriately limited.
Judge Higginbotham concurred in the result of the court of appeals decision in Jaffee on the authority of the Supreme Court's decision in Dinsman v. Wilkes. But for Dinsrnan, he suggested, he would
have adopted the views set forth "quite persuasively" by the district
67
court of the District of Columbia in Thornwell v. United States.
The Third Circuit has granted rehearing in banc in the Jaffee
case. 6 8 Thornwell, to which Judge Higginbotham referred in his
concurrence, suggests a partial remedy for the plaintiffs -albeit one
not commensurate with the extent of the alleged wrongdoingshould the court on rehearing insist upon a blind application of Feres
with regard to the immunity issue. 69 Like Jaffee, Thornwell was an
action by a former serviceman for injuries incurred as a result of a
"brutal ... scheme of human experimentation." 70 While stationed
in France in the 1950's. Thornwell was given LSD, without his knowledge or consent, pursuant to a covert government program which
71
was intended to test the drug's efficacy as an aid to interrogation.
Although the Thornwell court felt bound by Feres to dismiss the
claim for injuries sustained while on active duty, 72 the court held that
plaintiff had stated a separate cause of action under the fifth amendment for the failure to "provide [Thornwell] with any follow-up

66 Slip op. at 5.

67 Slip op. at 28 (Higginbotham, J., concurring)(citing Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C.
1979)). Not only did Thornwell deal with allegations similar to those in Jaffee, see text accompanying notes 71-72 infra, but the court in Thornwell disposed of them in the same manner
that the district court in Jaffee disposed of them. Plaintiffs in both cases sought to distinguish
Feres on the ground that it applied to claims for negligence rather than to intentional depriva-

tions of constitutional rights. Compare 471 F. Supp. 348 with 468 F. Supp. at 634. Both district
courts rejected this argument reasoning that "neither the language nor the rationale of the
Court's decision" supported the distinction. See 471 F. Supp. at 348; 468 F. Supp. at 634.
Judge Higginbotham noted that the court was "disadvantaged ... because the Supreme
Court has not, since 1851 . . . focused on the type of intentional tort in a military context that"
was in issue in Jaffee. Moreover, the Court, with two exceptions, has consistently refused to
address the question of the proper interpretation of Feres. See Rhodes, supra note 4, at 28.
68 Jaffee v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Apr. 10, 1980)(order granting rehearing in
banc and vacating judgment of Feb. 20, 1980).
69 See 471 F. Supp. at 353-55; slip op. at 5 & n.4, 19 n.25.
70 471 F. Supp. at 346.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 347-49.
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examinations, supervision, or other medical treatment during the
seventeen years after his discharge." 73 The court found that such
recovery was not only "consistent with Feres" but compelled by
United States v. Brown, 74 a 1954 Supreme Court decision which
permitted recovery under the FTCA for an injury incurred by a vet'eran after his discharge. 75 Furthermore, the court declard that
"Feres . ..can have no application when [post discharge] intentional
or unconstitutional conduct is involved." 7 6 Thus, even if the court
on rehearing determines that Feres prohibits recovery for any injury
incident to military service regardless of whether negligently or intentionally inflicted, plaintiffs in Jaffee may still seek recovery under the
fifth amendment, including punitive damages,

77

for injuries sustained

in the course of the post discharge cover-up of the nuclear experiments.
The arguments in favor of absolute immunity apply with far
greater force to negligent activity than to willful deprivations of
constitutional guarantees. 78 Immunity is an exception to the rule requiring individual responsibility, and as an exception it should not be
construed so as to accomplish more than its intended purpose. A

qualified immunity protects those who the courts are seeking to immunize by exposing to liability only those officials who demonstrate a
73 Id. at 349. Although this language was used in reference to a post discharge cause of
action for negligence, the Thornwell court characterized count five, wherein Thornwell alleged
an intentional cover-up, as an alternative to count four's claim for negligence. Id. at 353.
The Jaffees alleged that defendants failed to warn veterans who participated in the nuclear
experiments of the ongoing risk from inhalated radioactive particles. The "[pirospects for successful treatment" of the diseases which the atomic veterans have developed as a result of
radiation exposure "decrease markedly when diagnosis and/or therapy is delayed." Amended
Complaint at 9. See also slip op. at 5.
[W]e have no occasion to consider whether an allegation that governmental officials
knew of the risk of ongoing damage from ingested radioactive particles and deliberately or negligently failed to warn Jaffee of the ongoing hazard after Jaffee left
military service would state a claim under [the FTCA].
Id.
74Id. at 349 (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954)).
75 348 U.S. at 353.
76 471 F. Supp. at 353.
77See Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. at 1473. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question it has indicated that punitive damages are available in a Bivens
action. Id.
The inadequacy of the FTCA as a mechanism for deterrence is reflected in its express
prohibition against awarding punitive damages to the victims of unlawful governmental activity.
Id. at 1474.
Plaintiffs in Jaffee sought $10,000,000.00 in punitive damages. Amended Complaint at 7.
78 "[C]ivil-liability incentives may operate in different ways, varying in their effects with the
class of act to which they are applied." Shepsle, Official Errors and Official Liability, 42 L. &
CONTEMP. PsOB. 35, 36 (1978).
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deliberate and egregious disregard for the constitutional rights of servicemen; The abrogation of absolute immunity will promote "imilitary
responsivehness] to basic principles of personal integrity." 79 Through
a careful analysis of the interaction between federal common law and
the law of immunity, the Jaffee court "'achieve[d] a more finely
ground product from the judicial mill," 80 a product which insures the
continued maintenance of military discipline and yet assures redress
to the victims of willful military wrongs.
Maureen E. McTernan

79 Slip op. at 16.

I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion that
though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet
excuse from damages. I was much inclined to think that a distinction ought to be
taken between acts of civil and those of military officers; and between proceedings
within the body of the country and those on the high seas. That implicit obedience
which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors, which indeed is
indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared to me strongly to imply
the principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify
the person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of
his country in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them. ...
But I have been convinced that I was mistaken.
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).
80 Butz, 438 U.S. at 529 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

